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Das Wichtigste in Kürze
In Zeiten demographischer Alterung und potentiellem Fachkräftemangel gewinnt die Be-
schäftigung älterer Arbeitnehmer zunehmend an Bedeutung. Da der Zufluss junger Ar-
beitsmarkteinsteiger nachlässt, richtet sich das Augenmerk der Unternehmen auf ihre be-
stehenden Belegschaften. Viele entwickeln Strategien um das Potential älterer Arbeitneh-
mer zu erhalten und versuchen, diese länger zu binden.
Um die Vorzüge und Risiken der Beschäftigung Älterer wissend, setzen Unternehmen
eine Vielzahl von Human Resources Maßnahmen (Personalmaßnahmen) ein, welche spe-
zifisch auf diese Gruppe ausgerichtet sind. Ältere Arbeitnehmer weisen häufiger als ihre
jüngeren Kollegen geringere physische und kognitive Fähigkeiten, niedrigere Flexibilität
und Mobilität auf. Typische Maßnahmen bestehen in altersgerechter Ausstattung des Ar-
beitsplatzes, verringerter Arbeitszeit, verringerten Leistungsanforderungen, Altersteilzeit-
regelungen sowie Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen. Wir bezeichnen all diese Human Resources
Maßnahmen als specific measures for older employees (SMOE). Die Auswirkungen die-
ser Maßnahmen auf den Beschäftigungsabgang und den Übergang in die Altersrente sind
bislang nicht erforscht.
In dieser Studie hinterfragen wir, ob SMOE mit längerer individueller Beschäftigungs-
dauer im jeweiligen Job und Betrieb einhergehen. Für unsere Analysen schätzen wir alterss-
pezifische Abgangsraten für Beschäftigte zwischen 40 und 65 Jahren. Wir verwenden einen
verknüpften Betriebs-Beschäftigten-Datensatz für Deutschland. Diese Daten enthalten In-
formationen zur Anwendung von SMOE auf der Betriebsebene und arbeitnehmerbezogene
Informationen zur Beschäftigungsdauer. 50 Prozent der Betriebe in unserem Datensatz,
die ältere Arbeitnehmer beschäftigen, wenden mindestens eine SMOE an.
Unsere Schätzergebnisse zeigen, dass Beschäftigungsperioden älterer Arbeitnehmer in
Betrieben mit altersgemischten Arbeitsteams länger andauern. Beschäftigungsabgänge von
Arbeitnehmern in diesen Betrieben sind im Alter von 52 bis 64 Jahren durchgehend ver-
ringert. Im Gegensatz dazu sind Beschäftigungsdauern in Betrieben die Altersteilzeitre-
gelungen anbieten kürzer als in anderen Betrieben. Für andere SMOE finden wir keinen
Einfluss auf die Beschäftigungsdauer älterer Arbeitnehmer.
Non-technical summary
In times of demographic ageing and potential skills shortages, employment of older workers
becomes an increasingly important topic. During the last centuries, firms in developed
countries have actively promoted early retirement. Now that birth cohorts decrease in
size and the inflow of young workers into employment dwindles, firms start to focus on
their existing workforces. Many firms develop strategies to preserve the potential of older
workers by inducing them to stay longer and transit to retirement later.
Knowing the advantages and potential risks of employing older workers, firms apply
a variety of human resources measures specifically targeted at this group. Older workers
more often than their younger colleagues exhibit declining physical and cognitive skills,
relatively low flexibility and mobility. Typical measures consist in the age-specific equip-
ment of the workspace, reduced working time, reduced work intensity, part-time schemes,
and training. We refer to these human resources measures as specific measures for older
employees (SMOE). This is the first study about the effects of SMOE on job exit or the
retirement decision.
In this study, we are interested in the question whether SMOE are associated with
longer employment duration of older workers in the respective company. For our analysis,
we estimate age-specific job exit rates for employees between 40 and 65 years. We use
longitudinal employer-employee data for Germany. The data contain information on the
existence of SMOE on the establishment level, which are extended by worker-specific
information on job duration. 50 percent of establishments that employ older workers
apply at least one SMOE.
Our estimation results show that employment spells of older workers last longer in
firms that apply mixed-age work teams. Job exits by workers in these firms are reduced
throughout from age 52 to 64. By contrast, employment durations in firms that partic-
ipate in an old-age part-time scheme are shorter as compared to other firms. All other
SMOE, like specific equipment of workspaces and training, are not related to a change of
employment duration for older workers.
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Abstract
We analyse the effects of specific measures for older employees (SMOE) on employment
duration of workers aged 40 and above. Using longitudinal employer-employee data
for German establishments, we account for worker and establishment heterogeneity
and correct for stock-sampling. We find a positive effect of mixed-aged team work on
employment duration and a negative effect of a part-time scheme addressed at older
workers. Employment duration does not appear to be related to other SMOE, such
as training and specific equipment of workplaces.
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1 Introduction
Against the background of demographic change and potential skills shortages, the em-
ployment of older workers becomes an increasingly important subject. Job exit of older
workers occurs early on exit routes such as unemployment (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2010),
disability pensions (Autor and Duggan, 2003), and early retirement (Blau, 1994; Börsch-
Supan, 2000). In the OECD countries, the average retirement age is currently 62 (OECD,
2009). While many firms have actively promoted early retirement in the past, there has
been an increasing awareness that firms are reliant on their existing workforces in recent
years. Therefore, many firms are developing strategies to preserve the potential of older
employees and to induce them to stay longer in their jobs (Harper et al., 2006). Given
low job mobility of older workers (Chan and Stevens, 2001; Ichino et al., 2007), enhanced
employment duration of old workers often implies that they transit to retirement later.
The advantages of employing older as opposed to younger workers consist in the greater
work experience and on average higher firm-specific human capital of older workers, their
personal reliability and loyalty to the firm, and their lower risk of quitting the job. Poten-
tial disadvantages are declining physical and cognitive skills, human capital obsolescence
and relatively low flexibility and mobility (Skirbekk, 2008). In order to deal with the
specific requirements of older workers, firms apply a variety of different human resources
policies specifically targeted at this group. These policies typically entail the age-specific
equipment of workplaces, reduced working time, reduced work intensity, reorganisation,
health or training measures. We refer to these human resources measures as specific mea-
sures for older employees (SMOE).
While these measures are often described as suitable instruments to deal with
performance-related consequences of an ageing workforce (Avolio et al., 1990), to our
knowledge, there no evidence on the relationship between SMOE and employment dura-
tion. In this paper, we are interested in the question of whether SMOE are associated
with longer employment duration of older workers in the establishments. In order to as-
sess this relationship, we estimate job exit rates for employees between the ages of 40
and 65. For our analysis, we use large longitudinal employer-employee data for Germany
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that combine register data on employees with survey data on establishments. In the data,
we observe the existence of SMOE at the establishment level and employment spells of
individual employees. The data contain information on the application of the following
specific measures for old employees: age-specific part-time work, age-specific equipment of
workplaces, reduced work requirements, mixed-age work teams, standard training that is
also offered to older employees, and specific training for older employees. In our sample,
50 percent of establishments1 employing older workers apply at least one SMOE.
Many existing studies estimate the determinants of job or employment duration, but do
not fully account for the fact that age is a time-varying variable. At best, theses studies
include age at job entry or age at job exit among the regressors (Abowd et al., 2006;
Boockmann and Steffes, 2010; Bronars and Famulari, 1997; Dohmen and Pfann, 2004;
Mumford and Smith, 2004). On the other hand, studies that focus on the job exit for old
employees typically focus on the age at exit and neglect or restrict the time-varying nature
of elapsed employment duration (e.g. Backes-Gellner and Veen, 2009). Given our focus
on older employees, a transition model for job exits should fully consider both duration
dependence, i.e. how transitions out of employment vary with tenure, and age dependence,
i.e. how transitions out of employment vary with age. Considering tenure, a 60-year-old
employee who just started a new job differs substantially from another employee who
has been in the current job for 30 years. On the other side, considering age, a 60-year-
old employee is likely to have a higher risk of leaving employment than a 30-year-old if
both have the same tenure. We disentangle the effects of age and duration by setting
up a transition model with simultaneous consideration of duration and age dependence.
Essentially, this results in a transition model with time-varying age effects, where survival
at any point in time depends on both the elapsed duration and the elapsed age of the
worker. This approach was inspired by a study of Imbens (1994), who models duration
and calendar time effects simultaneously (see also van den Berg and van der Klaauw,
2001; Dohmen and Pfann, 2004). We are not aware that such a model has previously been
1It is possible to compute representative shares for all German establishment, based on the IAB-
Establishment Panel. Using the cross-sectional weights reveals that 27,8% of all German establishments
that employ older workers applied at least one SMOE in 2002.
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used for the joint estimation of duration and age effects of old employees. Our transition
model consists of parts for age dependence, for duration dependence, and a time-invariant
explanatory part. The latter takes heterogeneity into account by exploiting a large set of
covariates. Furthermore, the richness of the data allows for including establishment fixed
effects. In this way, we consider the recent evidence of substantial heterogeneity between
firms with respect to employment duration (e.g. Abowd et al., 2006).
It is cumbersome to obtain representative samples of employment spells of older work-
ers, who are typically characterised by their long employment histories. Using a sample
of inflows into jobs can avoid length-bias and left-censoring in some situations. However,
the group of employees starting a new job when they are old is highly selective. Moreover,
workers starting their jobs at a younger age would have to be followed for a long period of
time until they are observed to be considered “old” in the data. Instead of using an inflow
sample, we therefore draw a stock sample of older workers employed at a particular date.
However, since long employment durations are over-represented in stock samples compared
to short durations (Lancaster, 1990), our estimator corrects for the stock sampling bias.
Our estimation results show that employment spells of older workers last longer in firms
applying mixed-age work teams as a SMOE. By contrast, we find that employment dura-
tions in firms that participate in a part-time scheme directed at older workers shorten
employment duration. Employment duration does not appear to be related to other
SMOE, such as training and specific equipment of workplaces. While we do not claim
that our results necessarily have a causal interpretation, our explorative study provides
empirical evidence that certain SMOE are related to a change of employment duration of
older workers while others are not.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly review previous
research on employment duration of older employees. In Section 3, we discuss specific
human resources measures for older employees. Section 4 presents the empirical approach.
We introduce the data set in Section 5 and show estimation results in Section 6. Section
7 concludes.
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2 Employment of older workers
Ageing of the workforce is partly due to increasing employment-rates of older workers.
In Germany, employment-rates of workers aged 60 to 64 has risen from 33 percent to 53
percent between 2000 and 2010 (Federal Employment Agency, 2011).
There is a large empirical literature on the determinants of job exit among older workers
and one branch of this literature is interested in retirement decisions and early retirement.
In our analysis, however, we are solely interested in the relationship between specific
human resource measures and job exit. Since profit maximizing firms are more likely to
focus on employment duration than on the fate of workers that leave the firm, our analysis
focuses on employment duration , independent of the target state. Nevertheless, there is
a close link between job exit of older workers and the transition to retirement, as both
decisions often coincide. This is particularly true for countries such as Germany, where
“bridge jobs” (Ruhm, 1990; Macunovich, 2009) are not frequently used in the job-stopping
process. Even where bridge jobs exist, it has often been observed that older workers faced
with choosing between the alternatives of retiring early or changing jobs in order to cut
back in terms of working time or job requirements mostly choose the first option (Hurd,
1993; Abraham and Houseman, 2004).
Early retirement decisions have been studied frequently, for instance in Börsch-Supan
(2000) and Gruber and Wise (2004). In this literature, sometimes structural models are
derived, based on the assumption of voluntary retirement transitions; Blau (1994) and
Gustman and Steinmeier (2004). However, transitions out of employment cannot always
be considered a voluntary decision of the employee, particularly in countries in which
strong institutional rules exist for the transition to retirement.
The institutional setting may either be related to the company or to government regu-
lations. In our study, we consider the companies’ policies. A number of determinants have
been singled out as institutional reasons for job exit of older workers. Blau and Shvydko
(2011) estimate the impact of company characteristics and (a lack of) flexibility on the
job separation probability. They suggest that a lack of part-time and flexible-hours work
schemes as well as lack of training and promotion opportunities for older workers may
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be responsible for the abrupt (and permanent) change from full time employment into
complete retirement.
Hurd and McGarry (1993) study the effects of job characteristics on retirement for
US workers. Among job characteristics, they look at physical and mental requirements
and job flexibility. They find that physical and mental job requirements only have little
influence on prospective retirement. By contrast, employer policies and job flexibility have
a large stabilizing effect on employment and delay the transition to retirement. Related
to the subject of our paper, the study by Cottini et al. (2011) for Denmark addresses the
question of whether voluntary turnover is influenced by adverse workplace conditions and
human resources measures. In particular, they look at the influence of High-Involvement
Work Practices on employee turnover. The authors define these practices as “a cluster
of complementary human resources management practices designed to promote employee
involvement” (p. 872). More precisely, they look at whether the worker has influence
on decisions concerning his/her work, whether the worker is informed of the decisions
affecting his/her workplace, and whether the worker has participated in courses or on-
the-job-training at his/her present workplace. They find that the first of these variables
indeed reduces the propensity to separate from the employer. Furthermore, they show
that the positive impact of some adverse workplace conditions is mitigated by the use of
High-Involvement Work Practices.
For Germany, there is evidence that employment duration of older employees is influ-
enced by firm-specific characteristics (Wübbeke, 1999). Moreover, the empirical person-
nel economics literature (Beckmann, 2007; Henseke and Tivig, 2008) suggests that firm
characteristics and working conditions are important determinants of employment and
re-employment after age 50.
Apart from adverse workplace conditions and employer measures to alleviate them,
technological change and corresponding human resources policies may be related to job
exit for old workers or retirement. Thus, Bartel and Sicherman (1993) find that unexpected
technological change induces workers to retire earlier, and that training in industries with
rapid technological change induces workers to retire later. In a similar vein, Schleife
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(2006) investigates the effect of computer use on employment of older workers. While it is
reasonable to hypothesise that older workers using computers have successfully adjusted
to technological change and are, therefore, more likely to retire later than other workers
(see also Friedberg, 2003), there is little empirical support for this proposition. As one
example, Biagi et al. (2013) do find evidence that computer use prolongs employment
among Italian men.
Finally, demand changes may affect older workers more strongly than younger workers,
if firms adjust to changing demand by promoting early retirement. Consistent with this
view, Gielen and van Ours (2006) find that older employees are more affected by firm-
specific fluctuations than younger employees in the Netherlands.
In addition to workplace conditions or other determinants related to the firm, social
security institutions create incentives for retirement by defining age criteria for eligibility
to certain benefits. Rust and Phelan (1997) show that social security institutions shape
the distribution of retirement. For instance, they show that eligibility of early retirements
benefits at the age of 62 produce a spike in the retirement distribution. Such incentives
are present in most social security systems, in particular in the pension system (Börsch-
Supan, 2000; Berkel and Börsch-Supan, 2004; Hakola and Uusitalo, 2005; Euwals et al.,
2010; Coile and Levine, 2007) and the system of unemployment insurance (Dlugosz et al.,
2009; Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2010). As we only consider transitions out of employment
in one particular year, 2002, our data cover a period with a stable institutional setting
and we do not aim to investigate the effects of changes in institutional rules concerning
retirement.
3 Specific human resources measures for older employees
Many firms implement specific human resources measures for older employees. These mea-
sures are based on the insight that generally older employees have different competencies
and requirements than their younger colleagues (Boockmann and Zwick, 2004; Skirbekk,
2008). In this section, we provide an overview of the following measures: specific equip-
ment of workplaces, reduced work requirements, mixed-age work teams, standard training
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offered to older employees, specific training for older employees, and age specific part-
time. These six measures were included as items in the 2002 wave of the survey part of
the LIAB (compare Section 5 and Appendix). Figure 1 shows the application of SMOE
by establishments employing older workers between 40 and 65 years of age, in 2002, the
year of our investigation. It displays sample frequencies. The six different SMOE differ
substantially in the extent to which they are used.
Figure 1: Specific measures for older employees in 2002
4% 
5% 
18% 
17% 
2% 
36% 
3% 
specific equipment of workplaces
reduced work requirements
mixed-age work teams
standard training
specific training
age-specific part-time
other programmes for older
employees
Application of SMOE by establishments. Source: LIAB data, own computations.
A specific equipment of workplaces is, for example, provided to compensate con-
straints in hearing or seeing capabilities of older employees (Harper and Marcus, 2006).
Examples for constraints in capabilities are an increased illumination of the workplace,
higher font size on screens, a higher contrast in signs, or protection from excessive envi-
ronmental noise (Magrain and Boulton, 2007; Spirduso et al., 2005). Implementation of
specifically equipped workplaces for older employees is likely to be associated with pro-
longed employment duration. We suppose that there can be two effects of specifically
equipped workplaces. First, older employees who work in an environment that satisfies
their age-specific needs are more productive than without the measure. Göbel and Zwick
(2010) support this hypothesis: application of specifically equipped workplaces is associ-
ated with higher productivity of workers aged 40 and above. Second, at an age-specific
workplace, older employees feel more comfortable and are less likely to leave their job due
to workplace-related reasons.
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Workplaces with reduced work requirements allow participating employees to stay
on their job until statutory retirement age is reached, but with a reduced work load.
Being offered reduced work requirements, an older employee is expected to stay longer in
the establishment and we expect that this measure prolongs their employment duration.
Older employees are likely to stay in establishments that are willing and able to reduce
the requirements if required.
Mixed-age work teams is another measure for the integration of older employees.
The idea is that older and younger employees have different strengths and weaknesses
stemming from varying experience, perspectives, and social networks (Kearney et al.,
2009). On the one hand, a mixture of different age groups can create cross-fertilisation of
ideas, a transfer of knowledge and experience, and a combination of resources for all age
groups since younger and older employees can concentrate on their comparative advantages
(Backes-Gellner and Veen, 2009). On the other hand, compulsory mixing of age groups
might be stressful for older employees. A job charged with stress is more likely to be quit
by the employee. The study by Börsch-Supan and Weiss (2007) finds no age differences
in productivity for workers of one assembly line at Daimler AG. Göbel and Zwick (2010),
in contrast, analyse a large data set for Germany and find that relative productivity
increases for older and younger employees in establishments that apply mixed-age work
teams. Given previous evidence, there is no strong expectation that mixed-age work teams
lead to increasing employment duration of older workers.
Participation in Standard training declines with age (Ben-Porath, 1967; Becker,
1975; Fitzenberger and Mühler, 2011). This can partly be explained by a lack of motivation
of older employees in improving human capital (Warr and Fay, 2001). At the same time,
some establishments offer older employees access to their standard training programmes
in order to deal with higher adaptability requirements of older workers in innovative firms
or in firms investing in information and communication technology (Aubert et al., 2006).
Controlling for self-selection into training, Picchio and van Ours (2012) find that firm-
provided training increases employment of older workers aged 50 to 64.
Older employees might have different training needs than younger employees because
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of different motivations for training participation or different skills to be trained. Several
firms offer specific training for older employees, which can meet their specific require-
ments. Provision of training should increase employment duration of older employees.
Age-specific training is likely to have even stronger effects on employment than standard
training. Yet, on the contrary, training for the elderly may yield opposite effects when
employees feel that they are bound to participate in training courses. When participation
creates stress and pressure, older employees are even more likely to quit earlier than in ab-
sence of the training courses. We separately analyse whether standard training or specific
training are associated with a change of the employment duration of older workers.
Age-specific part-time phases the transitions of elderly from work to retirement and
gradually passes their workplaces to younger employees. The measure offers a reduction
of work time in combination with a prolonged employment contract. Within the phasing
time span, human capital shall be preserved within the firm (Graf et al., 2011). When
applying part-time contracts, firms have the opportunity to preserve valuable skills and
knowledge of their older employees. Until 2009, age-specific part-time work was subsidised
by the German Federal Employment Agency. The subsidy was paid to the employer
for an employee older than 55 who reduces work time to 50 percent or less (Brussig
et al., 2009). Comparable part-time schemes have been evaluated in Austria (Graf et al.,
2011), the UK (Gielen, 2009), and Sweden (Wadensjö, 2006). For Austria and the UK,
the authors find that the programmes are not successful in prolonging work life of older
employees, but that subsidisation costs are high. For Sweden, (Wadensjö, 2006) isolates
a positive effect on labour supply of older employees. His finding is explained by the
consideration that the incentive to work part-time instead of full-time is higher than the
incentive to work part-time instead of retiring. By contrast, Charles and Decicca (2010)
implicitly emphasise the importance of flexible work time for older employees because their
labour supply preferences conflict with firms’ hours constraints. Concerning the subsidised
part-time scheme in Germany, Brussig et al. (2009) indicate that the measure is applied
mostly as a pathway to early retirement. Given this evidence, our expectation is that the
application of part-time-schemes for older employees shortens the employment duration
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of older employees, when they are used for early retirement. On the other hand part-
time work could lead to longer employment duration if the measure is used to smooth the
retirement process out.
4 Estimation approach
We specify a model that allows identification of age-specific transition rates out of em-
ployment. The transition model to estimate duration and age effects can be written as
θ(a|t,X) = θ0(a) · d0(t) · e(X), (1)
were θ(a|t,X) denotes the transition rate at age a, given employment duration t and
covariates X. The transition rate θ is the product of three distinct terms: The baseline
transition rate θ0(a), which is a function of age, a baseline duration part d0(t), which is a
function of employment duration, and the explanatory part e(X). Basically equation 1 is a
transition model where the key variables, age and employment duration are time-varying.
A similar specification has been applied by Imbens (1994), who uses a likelihood framework
to estimate duration and calendar time effects simultaneously. He also suggests that a
similar specification could be useful to estimate duration and age effects simultaneously.
Specification of the likelihood contributions
In our data, the information on employment duration is available on a daily basis. This
justifies the application of a duration model in continuous time.
For the age-specific transition rate, we specify a piecewise constant baseline θ0(a) =
exp(a1) for 0 < a ≤ a1, where a1 is the age at the end of the first year of the employment
spell. For further periods, θ0(a) = exp(at) for at−1 < a ≤ at for all t = 1, . . . , T , where
aT denotes the age at the end of the employment spell.
Duration dependence d0(t) is specified as piecewise constant function in a similar way
for t = 1, . . . , T , where t notes the elapsed employment duration since the start of the
employment spell. The explanatory part e(X) is specified as exp(X ′β) where X denotes
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the covariates and β is the vector of corresponding parameters.
We specify the transition function in equation 1 over age 40 to 65, that has been
considered in our sample. Employment durations are indexed from 1 to 6, where “6”
denotes employment durations that last longer than six years. Employment durations of
one year denote the reference:
θ(a|t,X) = exp
( 65∑
i=40
αiai
)
· exp
 6∑
j=2
δjtj
 · exp(X ′β). (2)
The survival function, which provides the survival probabilities for a worker at age
a given that he survived employment duration t and given the explanatory variables X
comprises the integral over the transition function since the start of the employment spell:
S(a|t,X) = exp
(
−
ˆ
θ(a|t,X)
)
. (3)
In other words, the survival probabilities at age a depend on the development of the
individual transition rates since the start of the employment spell, taking into account,
that workers survive time-varying transition risks that depend as well on age as on elapsed
employment duration. The likelihood function allows for exogenous right-censoring, e.g.
when employment continues after the end of the observation period.2 The individual
likelihood contribution (with c = 1 when the employment spell is right-censored and c = 0
otherwise) can be written as
Li = [θ(a|t,X) · S(at|t,X)](1−c) · [S(at|t,X)]c . (4)
Stock sampling
Within a framework for employment durations and job exits of older employees, sampling
is particularly involved as employment durations can be very long. An employee who
started an ongoing employment spell at age 21 has achieved an employment duration of
2We restrict our analysis to the year 2002, this implies that ongoing employment spells are right censored
at December 31st, 2002. This sample restriction is imposed because the application of SMOE is only
observed in 2002 and the application of SMOE my change over time.
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39 years at age 60. For older employees, flow sampling of employment spells is selective
as employees who start a new job when they are old are a specifically selected group of
the population of older employees. Moreover, since the data provides only information for
a fixed observation period, with a flow sample we would only observe employment spells
with a maximum duration equal to the length of this observation period. Since we are
interested in the outcomes for all old employees, including long-lasting employment spells,
we therefore draw a stock sample for our analysis. However, using stock-sampling, we
have to correct for stock-sampling bias, as discussed in the following.
For our analysis we sample from the stock of workers that are employed at January
1st, 2002. It is well known, that stock sampling generates a bias, i.e. long employment
spells are over-represented as compared to shorter employment spells (e.g. Lancaster, 1990;
Berger and Black, 1998). This affects the estimates of the duration dependence as well as
the distribution of associated observables and unobservables in the sample. We did not
find a discussion on the relationship between (stock) sampling and identification of age-
effects in the literature. However, both, the duration dependence as well as the age of the
employee jointly determine the transition rate at a given age. Since duration dependence
and age effects are interdependent, the consideration of stock-sampling bias, as discussed
for standard duration models, is also relevant for the identification of age-effects.
For correcting the bias in our transition model, we follow Berger and Black (1998)
and augment the individual contribution to the likelihood function by conditioning on the
survival until as, the age (and associated elapsed employment duration) of the worker at
sampling date. For example, we multiply the individual likelihood contribution with the
term 1S(as−a0) , where a0 is the age at the start of the employment spell.
3 Consequently,
S(as − a0) is the survival probability at employment duration (as − a0).
Given a transition function θ(a|t,X) that depends on age, duration and covariates,
the survival rate can be written as S(as− a0|t,X) = exp(−
´ as
a0
θ(a|t,X) d a). Putting the
sampling correction into the individual likelihood contribution for an observed transition
3In other words, we condition on survival up to ages. See Lancaster (1990, p. 183) or Berger and Black
(1998).
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at age a yields
Li = θ(a|t,X) · S(at|t,X)
S(as − a0|t,X) (5)
= θ(a|t,X) · exp(−
ˆ at
as
θ(a|t,X) d a),
so the part of the integral before stock sampling cancels out, in the case without unob-
served heterogeneity (see also Bergemann and Mertens (2011)). The individual likelihood
contribution with this correction for stock sampling is
Li = [θ0(a|t,X) · S(at − as|t,X)](1−c) · [S(at − as|t,X)]c . (6)
Considering stock-sampling, we also take into account, that the size of the time window,
in which the the observed spells could have started depends on the duration of the observed
spell. For example, consider spells with a duration in the interval of [0;1) months. Given
the sampling date is January 1st, 2002, it follows, that these spells have to be started
during a one month time window just before the sampling date, i.e. the spells must have
started during December 2001, with a job exit in January 2002. Now, consider another
example, spells with a duration in the interval of [1;2) months. Again, these spells could
have started during the month just before sampling date (December 2001) with a job exit
during February 2002. But now, there is an additional possibility: These spells could
also have started during November 2011 with a job exit in January 2002. This example
illustrates that the sampling probability of spells depends on the size of the time window in
which the spell could have started. Since the time window, in which spells with a duration
in the interval of [0;1) months is only half as large as the time window for spells with a
duration in the interval [1;2), in our stock sample, we observe almost twice as much spells
for the latter case. This example illustrates that the probability to be sampled depends
on the observed duration and the implied size of the time-window in which these spells
could have started. In order to correct for this sampling property, we additionally weight
each observation with it’s inverse sampling probability that follows from the variations of
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the size of the time window, in which the observed spell could have started4.
5 Data
We use the LIAB, a German longitudinal employer-employee data set of the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB).5 The version of the data we use contains survey information
on establishments in the years 2000 to 2002, and retrospective register data for all workers
that were employed within this time span. Employee data stem from German social secu-
rity employment registers and from unemployment registers by the Federal Employment
Agency. Civil servants, the self-employed and inactive workers are not covered, since they
are not subject to social security contributions. In this data, individual information on
wages, tenure, education, experience, profession, and benefit recipiency status is available
on a daily basis. Employer information is collected at the establishment level in annual
surveys. The data contains information on industrial relations and human resources man-
agement, business development and establishment characteristics.6 In the 2002 wave,
which is used for our analysis, establishments are interviewed about their use of specific
measures for older employees.
The total sample consists of 1,063 West German establishments.7 We impose the re-
striction that a firm has to have at least five employees aged 40 to 65. This restriction is
justified by computational reasons of estimations with establishment fixed effects. To the
establishment data, information is linked on all workers between ages 40 and 65 employed
by the establishments in 2002. The number of employees in our sample is 241,042. We
are able to observe employees back to 1975.8 Since some of the employment spells started
before 1975, about 20 percent of observed employment spells are left-censored. We at-
4Under the assumption of constant inflow, this sampling probability is proportional to the size of the
time window in which the spell could have started.
5The version of the data set is LIAB longitudinal model 1.
6The data set is described in more detail in Boockmann and Steffes (2007). Their paper describes
definitions of employment, unemployment, and non-employment, which we applied in the same way.
7We exclude East German establishments from our analysis, since for these establishments there is no
data available before the 1990th.
8The data set covers full information on employment and unemployment from 1993 on. But we also
have information on the start of the current employment spell, given it started after 1st January 1975. In
1975, electronic register data collection was initiated by the (West) German Federal Employment Agency.
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tribute a random job start for these workers, assuming a constant rate for employment
start between the age of 20 and their age at January 1st, 1975.
The definition of employment duration in our study is as follows: employment duration
or tenure is the time t a worker is employed by one establishment. The duration is the
period from the start until the end of an employment relationship within a particular
establishment. Similar to Boockmann and Steffes (2010) we allow the job to be interrupted
by up to 92 days, which might be caused by seasonal employment or short periods of
non-employment. We assume short interruptions to be a recall to the same employer.
Employment ends if either the worker has a transition into unemployment, a job with
another establishment, non-employment, or if the current employer reports the end of the
employment relationship to the social insurance institution (see Boockmann and Steffes,
2010, who apply the same definition of employment).
In the 2002 LIAB questionnaire, establishments are asked about SMOE with respect
to the six measures discussed in Section 3: reduced working time, specific equipment
of workplaces, reduced work requirements, age-mixed teams, standard training offered
to older employees, and specific training for older employees. Our empirical analysis is
based on several sub-samples of older employees. Establishments are grouped according to
application of SMOE. In this way, we obtain six groups of establishments that apply the
respective measure and six different comparison groups that do not apply the respective
measure. One should keep in mind that establishments that apply more than one SMOE
appear in more than one sample.
In Table 1, we display descriptive information on establishment and employee charac-
teristics for all groups defined by the application of SMOE. The first obvious difference
between establishments offering or not offering SMOE is their size, measured by the num-
ber of employees. As an example, establishments that provide training employ on average
2,091 workers, while those not offering training only have 1,206 employees. Another no-
ticeable difference is the gender ratio, e.g. the share of female employees. Establishments
with SMOE have on average fewer female employees. The gender difference is particularly
large for establishments that provide specifically equipped workspaces (24 percent) and
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offer reduced work requirements (22 percent). Striking differences in establishment char-
acteristics are whether the firm is subject to collective agreements and possesses a works
council. Both are clearly more prevalent in establishments with SMOE. Correspondingly,
the shares of blue-collar workers and white-collar workers differ.
For computational reasons, all following estimations are based on a random draw of
300 establishments, which has a sample size of 59,099 worker observations.
6 Estimation results
In this section, we present results for the analysis of duration and age-effects for transition
rates out of employment of older workers and their relation to the application of SMOE.
As described in Section 4, the dependence of job exit on age is modelled by a piecewise
constant baseline hazard with annual intervals. We investigate the impact of SMOE on
job exit for each year of age beyond 40, i.e. we cover 25 years, from age 40 to 65. Duration
dependence is also specified as piecewise constant with annual intervals.9
The graph on the left in Figure 2 shows the descriptive age profile of transition rates
for employees aged 40 to 65, irrespectively of the use of SMOE by their employers. The
profile is characterised by a strong increase in the transition rates as workers reach age 55.
For middle-aged employees between 40 and 54, there are little changes in the transition
rates, with annual transition probabilities between 0.1 and 0.15. As expected, after age
55, the transition probably increases dramatically. There are particularly strong increases
at ages 55, 60, 63, and 65. After age 65, i.e. regular pension age, only few transitions out
of employment occur. This is why we refrain from calculating transition rates above age
65.
In the graph on the right in Figure 2, descriptive transition rates show transition
rates according to years of tenure (i.e. duration dependence). The tenure profile shows
a familiar pattern (compare, e.g., Boockmann and Steffes, 2010); immediately after the
start of a new employment spell, transition rates out of employment are very high. With
9As mentioned above, we restrict duration effects to be equal beyond an employment duration of 6
years.
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Figure 2: Age and duration profile of transition rates
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Transition rates out of employment by age and by tenure; tenure in years. Descriptive profiles.
increasing job duration, the risk of job exit decreases substantially and remains roughly
constant after five years (with the exception of a small spike at seven years duration).
Therefore, we use dummy variables for each year of tenure from one to five years of tenure
and a further dummy for all durations beyond five years in our estimations. Both age and
duration profiles shown here are corrected for the bias induced by stock sampling.
In the estimations of the hazard rate model, the age profiles are interacted with each
of our six different SMOE. Thus, the impact of SMOE on job exit is estimated as the
difference in the age effect on transitions between workers in establishments using a specific
type of SMOE and workers in the establishments not applying the SMOE. Note that we
have to normalise the difference at a particular age when using firm-level fixed effects
because the fixed effect absorbs the effect of the SMOE. We choose to normalise the
difference at age 40, thereby assuming that SMOE do not influence transition probabilities
at that age. We will discuss the plausibility of this assumption after presenting the results
further below.
We estimate three different specifications for the explanatory part in equation 1. Our
preferred specification includes employee characteristics and establishment-level fixed ef-
fects. This specification is the least restrictive of our models since it allows for unobserved
time-constant heterogeneity at the firm level. Employee characteristics are gender, nation-
ality, daily wage (mean set to zero), formal education, job position, and type of occupation.
17
The second specification includes establishment-level covariates from the survey instead
of establishment fixed effects. These estimates are instructive for an analysis of the rela-
tionship between establishment characteristics and the transitions out of employment for
older workers. In this specification, we include firm size, skill structure, legal form, type of
wage bargaining, works council, and the shares of female and older workers. In addition,
we estimate a third specification without any covariates or fixed effects. In the following,
we present our fixed-effects estimation results and discuss their differences to the other
two estimators; results for these other estimators are contained in the internet appendix.10
The estimated age profiles for establishments with and without SMOE are shown in
Figures 3 to 8. For reduced work requirements, the estimated age profiles can be
found in Figure 3. Reduced work requirements do not influence employment duration of
older workers; there are no significant differences between establishments applying or not
applying this measure for any of the age groups between 41 and 65. From the results for
the other two specifications, we find significantly lower exit rates in establishments using
reduced work requirements only for a small number of age groups. Unexpectedly, there is
also a positive effect at age 55 in the model with establishment variables. All in all, the
effects are either insignificant or appear to be unsystematic.
Transition profiles for mixed-age work teams are displayed in Figure 4. This mea-
sure seems to reduce transition rates of older workers substantially in most of the age
groups. Even at ages 45 and 52, transition rates are significantly lower in establishments
using mixed-age work teams. Starting at age 55, the differences in transition rates are
quite large in magnitude and are further increasing with age. The fact that an impact
appears to be present even at relatively low age could guard against the normalisation of
age profiles at age 40. However, the differences from age 55 to 65 would remain substantial
even if the normalisation were done with respect to any other age group from age 40 to 50.
Therefore, it appears that the application of mixed-age work teams are associated with
prolong employment spells of older workers.
In Figure 5, we show the transition profiles of those establishments that do and those
10The internet appendix can be downloaded here: http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-
docs/div/DP12_059_paper_age_duration_appendix.pdf .
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that do not offer age-specific part-time. Several variants of this part-time scheme exist.
The “block model”, according to which the employee works full-time during the first half
of the scheme and then reduces working time by 100% for the second half, is the most
frequent one. Even if the worker is effectively retired in the second half of the scheme,
he or she counts as being employed in our data. If there is substitution between age-
specific part-time and other means of early retirement, we would expect the presence of
the scheme to prolong (nominal) employment durations. In the case, unlike in the “block
model”, in which the employee actually chooses to work part-time during the scheme,
employment duration could also be increased if this helps older workers reconcile work
and leisure. The results, however, suggest that the application of age-specific part-time
tends to reduce employment duration. However, the difference is only significant at ages
58 and 63. The results of the other two models suggest that the measure is related to
longer employment duration of “younger older workers” aged below 55. This could be
explained by the additional benefit that participation in the scheme conveys to workers,
which could induce them to separate from these establishments later. In our preferred
fixed-effect specification, however, the effect on workers below 55 is not present.
Figures 6 and 7 show the age profile for age-specific training and standard train-
ing, respectively. In both cases, we expect the measures to decrease transition rates. By
giving older workers access to training programmes, the employer’s interest in keeping
these workers in employment increases. However, the figures show that training does not
relate to transition rates out of employment. Exit rates have the same magnitudes irre-
spective of whether training is provided. The differences are never statistically significant.
In the models without covariates and with firm-level variables instead of fixed effects, we
do find significantly negative effects of standard training (but not of age-specific training)
on transition rates at ages 45 to 55. Since the effect vanishes with the inclusion of estab-
lishment fixed effects, it is probably due to unobserved heterogeneity at the establishment
level correlated both with training and the transition rate.
Finally, the transition profile of establishments that apply specific equipment of
workplaces is contained in Figure 8. Although older workers’ transition rates out of
19
their jobs appear to be lower in establishments with specifically equipped workplaces,
these differences are never statistically significant. We conclude that the use of specific
equipment of workplaces is not used as a means to increasing older workers’ employment
duration.
We briefly comment on the influence of worker and establishment characteristics on the
exit rates of older workers from their jobs (see Table 2). Among the individual character-
istics, women tend to have lower exit rates than men. As expected, a higher wage reduces
transitions. Perhaps surprisingly, white-collar employment is associated with higher exit
rates; this could be due to a more frequent use of early retirement in these occupations.
The use of age-specific part-time increases the exit rate; this is consistent with the esti-
mated effect of this measure at the establishment level. There is little systematic influence
of education, which is plausible for the group of older workers. The effects do not differ
much between the models with and without fixed effects.
Among establishment characteristics, works councils and the use of ICT reduce tran-
sitions in our estimations; this is also found in other studies for employment durations of
younger workers (see, e.g., Boockmann and Steffes, 2010). The effect of workforce compo-
sition and company size are not strong. The same is true for the application of collective
agreements.
7 Conclusion
Many German firms apply specific human resources measures for older employees (SMOE).
These measures cover different aspects, such as the equipment of workspaces, working
time and intensity of work, mixed-age work teams and training. In this paper, we have
investigated the difference of older workers’ exit rates from their jobs according to the use
of SMOE by their establishments. We apply a flexible specification to distinguish effects
at different ages, controlling for duration dependence and correcting for stock-sampling.
We show that, among the SMOE considered, only aged-mixed teams are positively
related to employment duration of older employees: transitions out of employment are
lower in firms that apply this SMOE. For other measures, such as training, reduced work
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requirements and specific equipment, we do not find a similar relation to employment
duration. Age-specific part-time is related to shorter employment durations of older work-
ers. This result may be surprising because the measure is intended as a means to increase
working time flexibility and provide a better work-life balance for older workers. Yet, the
result is in line with descriptive information from the literature on the use of age-specific
part-time as a means of early retirement.
The effect of mixed-age work teams complements existing evidence on the relationship
between productivity and the application of SMOE (Göbel and Zwick, 2010). Our analysis
could be extended in future research to differentiate the effect with respect to different
sectors or occupations. Backes-Gellner and Veen (2009) show that mixed-age work teams
have positive productivity effects for workers only in non-routine occupations. It would
be interesting to see whether this result transfers to employment durations.
The ineffectiveness of the other measures could be explained by a variety or reasons,
such as limited resources provided for training and the re-design of workplaces and other
difficulties of implementation. In any case, it needs to be stressed that, although we condi-
tion on a plethora of worker-level information and time-constant unobserved heterogeneity
at the establishment level, our effects are not necessarily causal. To derive causal effects,
one would need better data, e.g. detailed information on SMOE at the level of the worker.
However, high-quality worker-level data including information on participation in SMOE
are currently not available.
All in all, it appears that the search for suitable instruments of human resources
management to tackle demographic change and to better exploit the potential of older
workers must go on. Despite the importance of this subject, there have been only very
few quantitative studies that have addressed this topic. More research is required before
definite conclusions as to “what works in age management” can be drawn.
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Appendix
Question #50 from 2002 wave of the IAB establishment panel survey
“Which of the following measures concerning employment of older workers do you apply
in your establishment?”
• reduced working time
• specific equipment of workplaces
• reduced work requirements
• mixed-age work teams
• involvement of older workers in standard training programmes
• specific training for older workers
• no measures for older workers.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on employees and establishments
reduced work time specific equipment of workplaces
with measure without measure with measure without measure
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Employee characteristics
sex 0.285 0.451 0.342 0.474 0.209 0.406 0.309 0.462
job position
unskilled 0.254 0.435 0.244 0.430 0.368 0.482 0.227 0.419
skilled 0.212 0.408 0.259 0.438 0.244 0.430 0.210 0.407
white-collar 0.386 0.487 0.329 0.470 0.292 0.455 0.401 0.490
other 0.149 0.356 0.167 0.373 0.096 0.295 0.163 0.369
education
lower secondary 0.187 0.390 0.269 0.444 0.238 0.426 0.185 0.389
higher secondary 0.626 0.484 0.558 0.497 0.620 0.485 0.619 0.486
lower tertiary 0.007 0.085 0.005 0.067 0.004 0.065 0.008 0.087
higher tertiary 0.026 0.160 0.024 0.153 0.019 0.136 0.028 0.164
polytec 0.045 0.208 0.025 0.156 0.040 0.195 0.044 0.205
university 0.060 0.238 0.039 0.195 0.043 0.202 0.062 0.241
other 0.048 0.214 0.080 0.271 0.037 0.189 0.054 0.227
daily wage 103.771 33.396 84.355 36.848 105.951 30.036 100.948 35.065
nationality: not German 0.099 0.299 0.100 0.300 0.112 0.315 0.096 0.295
job type
standard full-time 0.938 0.242 0.960 0.197 0.938 0.241 0.940 0.237
old-age part-time 0.054 0.226 0.004 0.065 0.057 0.231 0.048 0.213
other 0.008 0.090 0.036 0.187 0.005 0.071 0.012 0.110
age in 2002 49.380 6.454 48.736 6.456 49.264 6.276 49.330 6.498
entry after 1975 0.792 0.406 0.885 0.319 0.758 0.429 0.811 0.391
exit before 2003 0.169 0.375 0.185 0.388 0.140 0.347 0.177 0.382
N of individuals 217669 23373 45307 195735
Establishment characteristics
total employees in 2001 1029.634 2526.693 166.863 476.553 1131.982 1994.914 641.207 2036.785
ICT 0.774 0.418 0.575 0.495 * 0.675 0.469
collective agreement (industry) 0.808 0.394 0.637 0.481 * 0.730 0.444
collective agreement (firm) 0.100 0.301 0.050 0.219 * 0.084 0.277
wages above agreement 0.071 0.257 0.188 0.391 * 0.120 0.325
legal form
individual firm * 0.072 0.259 * 0.033 0.177
partnership 0.079 0.270 0.123 0.328 * 0.097 0.295
private limited 0.410 0.492 0.582 0.494 0.482 0.502 0.476 0.500
public limited 0.179 0.384 * * 0.121 0.326
corporate 0.260 0.439 0.089 0.285 0.200 0.402 0.192 0.394
other 0.068 0.252 0.094 0.292 * 0.082 0.274
works council 0.937 0.244 0.425 0.495 * 0.715 0.452
share of . . .
blue-collar (unskilled) 18.459 22.508 24.279 28.011 25.473 25.633 20.190 24.834
blue-collar (skilled) 21.541 23.341 27.805 28.993 26.596 23.831 23.692 26.090
white-collar (low-skilled) 4.825 11.159 6.506 15.200 5.989 13.341 5.424 12.867
white-collar (high-skilled) 50.665 30.981 34.855 30.692 37.875 28.885 45.240 32.051
share of female employees 0.379 0.267 0.399 0.295 0.321 0.250 0.395 0.281
sector
farming, food and raw materials 0.090 0.286 0.1225962 0.328368 * 0.103 0.304
processing trade 0.170 0.376 0.1105769 0.3139851 0.200 0.402 0.141 0.348
machinery and technical 0.195 0.396 0.0913462 0.2884476 0.300 0.460 0.137 0.345
construction * 0.1129808 0.3169505 * 0.059 0.235
trade and repair 0.073 0.260 0.1706731 0.3766761 * 0.120 0.325
traffic and telecommunication * 0.0504808 0.2191985 * 0.037 0.188
credit and insurance 0.063 0.244 * * 0.054 0.225
data processing, R&D * * * *
legal advice, renting, advertising * 0.0841346 0.2779238 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.229
education and health 0.158 0.365 0.1298077 0.3364964 * 0.151 0.358
catering, education, health * 0.0528846 0.2240726 * 0.036 0.186
public administration, lobbying 0.139 0.346 * * 0.097 0.295
N of establishments 647 416 110 953
— continued on next page —
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— continued —
reduced work requirements mixed-age work teams
with measure without measure with measure without measure
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Employee characteristics
sex 0.183 0.387 0.323 0.468 0.264 0.441 0.307 0.461
job position
unskilled 0.343 0.475 0.226 0.418 0.270 0.444 0.242 0.429
skilled 0.261 0.439 0.203 0.402 0.261 0.439 0.187 0.390
white-collar 0.307 0.461 0.402 0.490 0.339 0.473 0.407 0.491
other 0.089 0.284 0.169 0.375 0.130 0.337 0.164 0.370
education
lower secondary 0.207 0.405 0.192 0.394 0.203 0.402 0.190 0.392
higher secondary 0.580 0.494 0.631 0.482 0.645 0.479 0.603 0.489
lower tertiary 0.004 0.060 0.008 0.089 0.005 0.072 0.008 0.089
higher tertiary 0.016 0.125 0.029 0.168 0.024 0.154 0.027 0.162
polytec 0.049 0.216 0.041 0.199 0.038 0.192 0.046 0.210
university 0.044 0.204 0.063 0.242 0.055 0.227 0.061 0.239
other 0.101 0.301 0.036 0.186 0.030 0.170 0.065 0.246
daily wage 110.356 30.182 99.325 34.965 103.158 31.954 101.075 35.592
nationality: not German 0.133 0.340 0.089 0.285 0.097 0.296 0.101 0.301
job type
standard full-time 0.941 0.235 0.939 0.239 0.937 0.244 0.942 0.234
old-age part-time 0.056 0.230 0.047 0.212 0.055 0.229 0.045 0.208
other 0.003 0.054 0.013 0.114 0.008 0.088 0.013 0.112
age in 2002 49.416 6.375 49.288 6.481 49.350 6.337 49.297 6.532
entry after 1975 0.740 0.439 0.820 0.384 0.772 0.419 0.820 0.385
exit before 2003 0.145 0.352 0.178 0.382 0.162 0.368 0.176 0.381
N of individuals 56019 185023 94150 146892
Establishment characteristics
total employees in 2001 1102.025 2220.704 640.304 2008.057 1015.736 1730.149 590.347 2115.065
ICT 0.832 0.376 0.679 0.467 0.787 0.410 0.667 0.471
collective agreement (industry) 0.790 0.409 0.735 0.441 0.795 0.404 0.724 0.447
collective agreement (firm) * 0.076 0.266 * 0.084 0.278
wages above agreement * 0.122 0.327 0.106 0.309 0.120 0.325
legal form
individual firm * 0.033 0.178 * 0.038 0.192
partnership * 0.093 0.291 0.083 0.276 0.100 0.300
private limited 0.479 0.502 0.477 0.500 0.421 0.495 0.494 0.500
public limited * 0.122 0.327 0.189 0.392 0.105 0.307
corporate 0.176 0.383 0.195 0.396 0.213 0.410 0.187 0.390
other * 0.081 0.272 0.087 0.282 0.075 0.264
works council * 0.718 0.450 0.902 0.298 0.685 0.465
share of . . .
blue-collar (unskilled) 27.432 26.475 19.893 24.645 21.033 25.345 20.644 24.849
blue-collar (skilled) 26.352 22.718 23.695 26.236 25.938 26.256 23.382 25.733
white-collar (low-skilled) 5.351 10.856 5.500 13.153 4.622 10.241 5.753 13.637
white-collar (high-skilled) 36.121 27.091 45.532 32.209 43.730 30.878 44.713 32.106
share of female employees 0.328 0.262 0.394 0.280 0.363 0.283 0.394 0.277
sector
farming, food and raw materials * 0.106 0.308 0.094 0.293 0.105 0.307
processing trade 0.176 0.383 0.143 0.350 0.169 0.376 0.140 0.347
machinery and technical 0.269 0.445 0.140 0.347 0.181 0.386 0.146 0.353
construction * 0.059 0.236 * 0.058 0.234
trade and repair * 0.114 0.318 * 0.125 0.331
traffic and telecommunication * 0.036 0.186 * 0.040 0.195
credit and insurance * 0.052 0.222 * 0.051 0.219
data processing, R&D * * * *
legal advice, renting, advertising * 0.055 0.228 * 0.051 0.219
education and health * 0.149 0.357 0.157 0.365 0.143 0.351
catering, education, health * 0.032 0.176 * 0.036 0.186
public administration, lobbying * 0.102 0.302 0.114 0.319 0.098 0.297
N of establishments 119 944 254 809
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standard training specific training
with measure without measure with measure without measure
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Employee characteristics
sex 0.261 0.439 0.313 0.464 0.325 0.468 0.288 0.453
job position
unskilled 0.235 0.424 0.267 0.442 0.212 0.409 0.256 0.436
skilled 0.245 0.430 0.194 0.395 0.111 0.314 0.223 0.416
white-collar 0.387 0.487 0.375 0.484 0.554 0.497 0.369 0.483
other 0.132 0.339 0.165 0.371 0.124 0.330 0.152 0.359
education
lower secondary 0.186 0.389 0.202 0.401 0.141 0.348 0.198 0.399
higher secondary 0.620 0.485 0.619 0.486 0.476 0.499 0.628 0.483
lower tertiary 0.007 0.082 0.007 0.084 0.008 0.092 0.007 0.082
higher tertiary 0.028 0.165 0.025 0.155 0.034 0.182 0.025 0.157
polytec 0.043 0.204 0.043 0.203 0.058 0.233 0.042 0.201
university 0.063 0.243 0.054 0.227 0.102 0.302 0.056 0.229
other 0.053 0.224 0.050 0.217 0.180 0.384 0.043 0.203
daily wage 106.585 32.399 98.273 35.154 114.790 33.514 101.091 34.116
nationality: not German 0.096 0.295 0.102 0.302 0.068 0.251 0.101 0.302
job type
standard full-time 0.934 0.248 0.944 0.230 0.908 0.288 0.942 0.234
old-age part-time 0.058 0.234 0.043 0.202 0.084 0.278 0.047 0.212
other 0.008 0.089 0.013 0.114 0.007 0.086 0.011 0.105
age in 2002 49.536 6.389 49.150 6.504 49.620 6.602 49.299 6.447
entry after 1975 0.768 0.422 0.827 0.379 0.775 0.417 0.803 0.398
exit before 2003 0.156 0.363 0.181 0.385 0.194 0.395 0.169 0.375
N of individuals 104840 136202 14031 227011
Establishment characteristics
total employees in 2001 1305.595 2543.085 491.288 1798.621 1843.318 1983.587 667.661 2032.074
ICT 0.832 0.375 0.652 0.477 * 0.691 0.462
collective agreement (industry) 0.771 0.421 0.732 0.443 * 0.744 0.437
collective agreement (firm) 0.099 0.300 0.075 0.263 * 0.077 0.266
wages above agreement 0.107 0.310 0.120 0.325 * 0.118 0.323
legal form
individual firm * 0.040 0.196 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.175
partnership 0.092 0.289 0.097 0.297 * 0.097 0.296
private limited 0.370 0.484 0.512 0.500 * 0.478 0.500
public limited 0.233 0.423 0.090 0.286 * 0.124 0.330
corporate 0.206 0.405 0.189 0.391 * 0.191 0.393
other 0.095 0.294 0.072 0.259 * 0.078 0.268
works council 0.901 0.300 0.683 0.466 * 0.732 0.443
share of . . .
blue-collar (unskilled) 17.662 22.358 21.743 25.683 27.059 31.626 20.603 24.799
blue-collar (skilled) 20.687 22.626 25.074 26.770 14.869 17.583 24.185 25.988
white-collar (low-skilled) 6.069 13.638 5.291 12.667 2.698 6.213 5.542 13.011
white-collar (high-skilled) 50.839 30.805 42.398 31.869 50.410 31.612 44.353 31.812
share of female employees 0.376 0.272 0.390 0.281 0.367 0.212 0.387 0.280
sector
farming, food and raw materials 0.076 0.266 0.111 0.314 * 0.104 0.305
processing trade 0.210 0.408 0.126 0.332 * 0.144 0.351
machinery and technical 0.195 0.397 0.141 0.348 * 0.154 0.361
construction * 0.071 0.257 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.233
trade and repair 0.088 0.284 0.119 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.317
traffic and telecommunication * 0.044 0.205 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.188
credit and insurance * 0.042 0.202 * 0.049 0.216
data processing, R&D * * * *
legal advice, renting, advertising * 0.055 0.228 * 0.049 0.216
education and health 0.160 0.368 0.142 0.350 * 0.147 0.354
catering, education, health * 0.039 0.193 * 0.033 0.178
public administration, lobbying 0.103 0.305 0.101 0.302 * 0.103 0.304
N of establishments 262 801 22 1041
* Note: Due to data protection, mean values of binary variables are not indicated when one category obtains less
than 20 observations.
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Table 2: Estimated coefficients on full sample
individual-X and firm-X individual-X and firm-FE
estimate t-statistic estimate t-statistic
female -0.089 -2.843 -0.098 -2.986
non-German -0.043 -1.097 -0.054 -1.289
wage, demeaned -0.010 -22.180 -0.009 -19.958
job position (ref.: unskilled)
skilled 0.027 0.655 0.038 0.824
white-collar 0.199 4.955 0.186 4.284
other -0.128 -3.011 -0.061 -1.270
parttime -0.156 -3.431 -0.173 -3.655
education (ref.: lower secondary)
higher secondary -0.068 -2.024 -0.059 -1.621
lower tertiary -0.029 -0.210 -0.068 -0.497
higher tertiary 0.139 2.058 0.017 0.242
polytec 0.088 1.388 0.050 0.717
university -0.081 -1.372 -0.091 -1.471
other -0.109 -1.967 -0.109 -1.710
employees in 2001 0.000 -1.655
ICT -0.143 -3.396
wage agreement (ref.: none)
collective agreement (industry) 0.071 0.545
collective agreement (firm) -0.107 -0.757
wages above agreement -0.205 -1.469
legal form
individual firm 0.545 3.192
partnership 0.068 0.731
private limited 0.094 1.136
public limited 0.375 4.455
corporate -0.265 -3.309
works council 0.103 1.540
worker composition
blue collar (unskilled) 0.007 2.329
blue collar (skilled) 0.008 2.506
white collar (low-skilled) 0.008 2.335
white collar (high-skilled) 0.009 2.883
share of female employees 0.312 3.446
sector (ref.: farming, food and raw materials)
processing trade 0.291 5.546
machinery and technical 0.374 6.989
construction 0.447 4.109
trade and repair -0.335 -3.980
traffic and telecommunication 0.128 1.621
credit and insurance -0.131 -1.505
data processing, R&D -0.217 -2.468
legal advice, renting, advertising -0.215 -2.185
education and health -0.053 -0.603
catering, education, health -0.173 -0.941
public administration, lobbying 0.155 1.491
firm fixed-effects no yes
# obs. = 59099 # obs. = 59099
Log likelihood = -26042.9 Log likelihood = -24612.3
Schwarz B.I.C. = 26433.0 Schwarz B.I.C. = 26496.6
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Figure 3: Reduced work requirements
Transition rates by age. Profile with individual covariates and establishment fixed effects.
Figure 4: Mixed-age work teams
Transition rates by age. Profile with individual covariates and establishment fixed effects.
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Figure 5: Age-specific part-time
Transition rates by age. Profile with individual covariates and establishment fixed effects.
Figure 6: Age-specific training
Transition rates by age. Profile with individual covariates and establishment fixed effects.
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Figure 7: Standard training
Transition rates by age. Profile with individual covariates and establishment fixed effects.
Figure 8: Age-specific equipment of workspaces
Transition rates by age. Profile with individual covariates and establishment fixed effects.
35
